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Abstract
This contribution considers the impact of Kokkinakis at the grassroots level: to what 
extent do grassroots level actors know about the case of Kokkinakis and see in it an 
opportunity to further their own religion-related rights claims? To what extent has the 
case inspired social actors such as rights activists, cause lawyers or faith group members 
to mobilise for their own religion-related rights, whether in court, in the halls of govern-
ment, or in the streets? Has Kokkinakis left a mark on the individual citizen with con-
cerns to do with religious freedoms? These questions are addressed through empirical 
research conducted on the indirect effects of ECtHR religion-related case law, including 
Kokkinakis, at the grassroots level in Greece.
Keywords
indirect effects – proselytism ban – grassroots mobilization – Metaxas laws – Greek 
Orthodox – European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – freedom of religion or belief
1   This article draws on research conducted under the auspices of the European Research 
Council-funded Grassrootsmobilise Research Programme (GA No. 338463; see www.grass-
rootsmobilise.eu), and while Research Associate of the LSE Hellenic Observatory. I would 
like to thank Grassrootsmobilise programme manager Alexia Mitsikostas for her invaluable 
research assistance in preparation of this text; Agis Petalas for his guidance on the relevant 
Greek legal norms; and Margarita Markoviti for her excellent research which underpins the 
present text and her helpful feedback.
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1 Introduction
This contribution considers the impact of Kokkinakis at the grassroots level: to 
what extent do grassroots level actors know about the case of Kokkinakis and 
see in it an opportunity to further their own religion-related rights claims? To 
what extent has the case inspired social actors such as rights activists, cause 
lawyers or faith group members to mobilise for their own religion-related 
rights, whether in court, in the halls of government, or in the streets? Has Kok-
kinakis left a mark on the individual citizen with concerns to do with religious 
freedoms?
The research on which this contribution is based studies the indirect, 
or radiating – in Marc Galanter’s terms – effects of the European Court of 
Human Rights religion-related case law.2 Building on North-American socio- 
legal scholarship which maintains that the direct effects of case law – e.g., in 
the case of the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth ECtHR, or the 
Court), the extent to which the Court’s decisions have led to legal reform at 
the national level – is an interesting, but rather narrow field of study,3 the re-
search in question examines developments taking places in the shadow of that 
case law.  Specifically, it studies the extent to and ways in which the Court’s 
 religion-related jurisprudence influences grassroots level actors’ conceptions 
of, discourse about, and mobilisations in pursuit of their rights, whether 
through political or legal means; it also studies whether the case law alters ac-
tors’ perceptions of the political or legal opportunity structures available to 
them for the pursuit of their religion-related rights.
Insight into the indirect effects of the Court’s case law has been generat-
ed through empirical, qualitative research conducted at the grassroots level 
2   The research on which this contribution is based studies the indirect, or radiating – in Marc 
Galanter’s (1983) terms – effects of the European Court of Human Rights religion-related case 
law.
3   For a range of perspectives, see M. McCann, ‘Law and Social Movements’, in A. Sarat (ed.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 506–522; M. McCann, 
‘Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives’, 2 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science (2006), pp. 17–38; G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About 
Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); M. McCann, ‘Reform Litigation 
on Trial’, 17:4 Law & Social Inquiry (1992), pp. 715–743; M. Feeley, ‘Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, 
and Metaphors’, 17:4 Law & Social Inquiry (1992), pp. 745–760; G. Rosenberg, ‘Hollow Hopes 
and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann’, 17:4 Law and Social Inquiry (1992), 
pp. 761–778; M. Galanter, ‘The Radiating Effects of Courts’, in K.O. Boyum and L.M. Mather 
(eds.), Empirical Theories about Courts (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 117–142.
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in four country contexts: Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey.4 The present text 
focuses on Greece, the country context in which the Kokkinakis case arose. 
The formidable and extensive legacy of Kokkinakis over religious pluralism in 
Europe and beyond has been well established in this collection of articles. If 
we limit our scope to the legacy of Kokkinakis itself – i.e., what did Kokkinakis 
achieve in terms of religious rights’ awareness and pursuit at the grassroots 
level – it is nowhere more evident than in Greece. Likewise, still limiting our 
scope to this single case, its split legacy is also nowhere more evident than in 
Greece.
In the pages that follow I will present the historical background of anti- 
proselytism laws in Greece which gave rise to the prosecution of Minos Kok-
kinakis and so many others after him. I will then draw on empirical inter-
view-based research in Greece with a range of religious, legal, political and 
other social actors to illustrate the various, sometime contradictory, ways 
Kokkinakis has influenced their conceptions and pursuit of religion-related 
rights. Finally, the experiences and perspectives of Greek social actors with 
Kokkinakis are brought to bear on the 25-year old debates regarding the split 
legacy of the case.
2 Kokkinakis in Context
Kokkinakis arose in a context ripe with legal, political and social support for the 
prosecution of proselytism, with a deep history dating back to the establish-
ment of the Modern Greek state. A brief consideration of this history reveals 
the interconnectedness between the legal, social and political dimensions 
holding the anti-proselytism legislation in place.
After the successful revolution against the Ottoman Empire in 1821, newly 
independent Greece was ruled by the regency of the Bavarian King Otto, in-
stalled by the Great Powers. Georg von Mauer, the member of the regency 
responsible for issues of Church, Education and Justice, oversaw a series of 
measures effectively subjugating the church to the state. The declaration of au-
tonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate entailed one aspect of legalisation 
of the latter: the administrative leader of the five-member church Synod was to 
be the King (though Roman Catholic). The members of the Synod were hired 
by the government, and the presence of a royal commissioner representing 
the government was required at Synodal meetings and for the drafting of Syn-
4   For more information on research methods in Grassrootsmobilise, please see www 
.grassrootsmobilise.eu.
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odal decisions, which were then subject to government approval.5 In a second 
wave of church subjugation by the state, 412 of a total of 593 monasteries were 
closed and their properties were confiscated by the monarchy.6
A number of other circumstances during this period further pressed on 
Greek Orthodox sensitivities, including perceptions that Protestant and 
Catholic missionaries in the country were increasingly active on several fronts, 
and the exemption offered to the Greek Catholic monasteries that did not face 
closures as did Orthodox monasteries, and the fact that the regency and the 
king were not Orthodox.7
Thus, under a widespread impression of an attack on Orthodox tradi-
tions, many began to interpret the separation of the Greek Church from the 
Patriarchate as a conspiracy aiming to convert the people to Protestantism 
and  Catholicism. Between 1833 and 1852 there were fourteen peasant revolts. 
Though most of these actually reflected popular discontent over the intensive 
power centralisation and burdensome taxation under Otto, or were goaded by 
local overlords hoping to exact financial rewards from the state, nonetheless, 
the revolutions were expressed in terms of a struggle against an “infidel” (i.e., 
non-Orthodox) administration and in favour of the protection of local religion 
and custom.8
This is the social and political context in which a ban on proselytism was 
introduced into the first constitution of Modern Greece. Article 1 of the 1844 
constitution read:
The prevailing religion of Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Christian 
Church, whereas any other known9 religion is tolerated and its worship 
is carried out without hindrance under the protection of law; prosely-
tism and any other intervention against the prevailing religious faith is 
prohibited.
5   P. Dimitropoulos, State and Church: a Difficult Relationship (Athens: Kritiki, 2001), p. 59.
6   See ibid., p. 60; T. Stavrou, ‘The Orthodox Church and Political Culture in Greece’, in D.  Constas 
and T. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 43–4; and N. Kokosalakis, ‘Religion and Modernization in 
19th Century Greece’, 34:2–3 Social Compass (1987), p. 236.
7   V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Con-
flict in the Balkans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp. 103–4.
8   Ibid.
9   ‘Known religion’ in the Greek legal context entails a religion whose doctrines and worship are 
transparent and whose initiation process does not include secret rituals.
214 Fokas
Religion and Human Rights 12 (2017) 210–222
Article 1 of the constitutions of 1864, 1911, and 1927 remained identical.10 A 
change was introduced in 1952, reflecting a more ‘positive’ approach to other 
religions, moving from language of “tolerance” to that of “freedom” regarding 
minority religious groups.
The greatest change in approach came with the 1975, the current, constitu-
tion. Here the role of the church in relation to the state is set out in Article 3, 
not Article 1, and the ban on proselytism has been relegated to the 13th article, 
the main subject of which is – notably – religious freedom, rather than church-
state relations. Further, proselytism is banned now not only when carried out 
“against” the prevailing faith, but against any “known” religion. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 13 indicates that:
All known religions shall be free and their rites of worship shall be per-
formed unhindered and under the protection of the law. The practice of 
rites of worship is not allowed to offend public order or the good usages. 
Proselytism is prohibited.
Into this timeline must be inserted the ban’s embedding into Greek legislation. 
In 1938, under the military dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas, Compul-
sory Law11 (CL) 1363/193812 was introduced, defining the scope of proselytism 
and setting out its punishment by imprisonment, non-convertible into a fine.13 
According to CL 1363/1938, proselytism, ‘among other actions’, is committed 
when one attempts directly or indirectly:
to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious per-
suasion, with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of 
inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material 
assistance, or by fraudulent means, or by taking advantage of his inexpe-
rience, trust, need, low intellect, or naïveté.
10   With the exception of a minor stylistic change in the wording of ‘in Greece’.
11   “Compulsory Laws” are those introduced through emergency procedures (i.e., without 
legislative procedure). In a sense this applies to all laws introduced under the dictator-
ship, in the absence of a parliament and thus of the possibility of legislative procedure.
12   Later replaced by Art. 2 of Compulsory Law 1672/1939.
13   Parallels can be drawn with the legislation around blasphemy, also introduced under the 
Metaxas dictatorship and also still in effect in Greece and the subject of intense debate. 
See E. Fokas, ‘God’s Advocates: The Multiple Fronts of the War on Blasphemy in Greece’, 
in J. Temperman and A. Koltay (eds.), Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression: Comparative, 
Theoretical and Historical Reflections after the Charlie Hebdo Massacre (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, forthcoming 2017).
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CL 1363/1938 is particularly controversial for its vague wording which has al-
lowed for extremely strict interpretation of a broad range of actions rather 
fundamental to certain religious faiths (e.g., the distribution of pamphlets and 
brochures).
According to the Hellenic League for Human Rights, most likely the “tar-
get” of the Metaxas laws on proselytism were the Jehovah’s Witnesses (or, JWs) 
who, already in the 1930s had achieved significant growth in Greece.14 In the 
1940s, marked by civil war in Greece, the Witnesses were shunned by the left 
because of their base in the United States, and by the right because of their 
pacifist stance. And in 1953, by state decree (later overturned) all Witness chil-
dren were expelled from public schools.15 Further, according to one legal rep-
resentative of the JWs in Greece, during the junta (1967–1974) all marriages 
of JWs were annulled.16 Until recently at least, ‘police chasing Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses’ (following requests from representatives of the Orthodox Church or 
members of the public), has entailed a primary source of complaints with 
which the human rights section of the Greek ombudsman’s office has dealt 
annually.17 Thus we have examples of social and political negativity towards 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and their culture of proselytism spanning the better part 
of two centuries.
Minos Kokkinakis was the first person to be arrested under the 1938 law 
criminalising proselytism,18 detained over 60 times before the particular 1987 
arrest which led to the Kokkinakis case in the ECtHR. Traces of a predominant 
Greek public opinion on JWs and their persistent witnessing can be found in 
the dissenting opinion of the Greek judge in the Kokkinakis case:
On the one hand, we have a militant Jehovah’s Witness, a hardbitten 
adept of proselytism, a specialist in conversion, a martyr of the criminal 
courts whose earlier convictions have served only to harden him in his 
militancy, and, on the other hand, the ideal victim, a naïve woman, the 
wife of a cantor in the Orthodox Church (if he manages to convert her, 
what a triumph!). He swoops on her, trumpets that he has good news for 
14   ‘Freedom of religion’ [‘Περί θρησκευτικής ελευθερίας’], Hellenic League for Human Rights, 
http://www.hlhr.gr/περί-θρησκευτικής-ελευθερίας/, last accessed 23 May 2017.
15   M.D. Goldhaber, A People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007), p. 68.
16   Personal interview with Margarita Markoviti, 28 September 2015.
17   Personal interview conducted by the author with representative of the human rights sec-
tion of the Ombudsman’s Office of Greece, 14 January 2013.
18   Goldhaber, supra note 15, p. 67.
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her [and] … expounds to her his intellectual wares cunningly wrapped 
up in a mantle of universal peace and radiant happiness. Who, indeed, 
would not like peace and happiness? But is this the mere exposition of 
Mr Kokkinakis’s beliefs or is it not rather an attempt to beguile the simple 
soul of the cantor’s wife?
3 Grassroots Mobilisations in Greece in the Shadow of Kokkinakis19
Having established the social, political and legal context in which the case 
arose, I proceed to examine the impact of Kokkinakis at the grassroots level in 
Greece by considering the evidence from the field.20
Starting with the question of general awareness of ECHR religion-related 
case law and of Kokkinakis specifically, the data naturally (and unsurprisingly) 
divides itself into two categories: the perspectives of those with some legal ex-
pertise (cause lawyers, legal advisors to religious groups, etc.), and those of ‘the 
others’ (namely, representatives of religious minority groups).
In this “other” category we find a relatively low level of awareness of Kok-
kinakis amongst representatives of other (than Jehovah’s Witnesses) minority 
conscience-based groups. In interviews with representatives of several such 
minority groups, the closest indication of an awareness of the case was ex-
pressed with the words ‘sounds familiar’. All interviewees in question were 
vaguely aware that the prosecution of proselytism seems no longer to be an 
issue in Greece, but did not know to what this change in policy is attributable. 
And, according to Dr. Margarita Markoviti, several interviewees in this catego-
ry sought to use the interview opportunity to learn more about the Court and 
its case law in general.
19   It should be noted that there is an array of variables which necessarily influence grass-
roots level impact of ECtHR religion-related case law, including the place of the ECtHR 
case law in the national legal order (What is the status of international jurisprudence 
and, specifically, that of the ECtHR, at the domestic level? Does it take precedence over 
national law in cases of conflict between the two?), and where particular conscience-
based groups with rights claims stand in the ‘national religious order’ (in the context of 
hierarchies of rights and privileges amongst conscience-based groups found in all coun-
try contexts); space limitations do not allow an elaboration on the latter.
20   The interview data cited in this section was generated by Dr. Margarita Markoviti, the 
postdoctoral researcher for the Greek case study in Grassrootsmobilise (the few excep-
tions are duly noted); the bulk of the interviews were conducted between March 2015 and 
March 2017. This section entails a preliminary analysis based on the 28 interviews already 
transcribed at the time of writing (roughly three-fifths of the interviews in total).
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However, this low level of awareness of Kokkinakis is coupled with a very 
high degree of recognition among conscience-based minority groups of the 
pioneering role of JWs in terms of securing religion-related rights for minori-
ties in Greece. ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses are so active! How do they do that?’ asked 
a representative of the Atheist Union of Greece. (Notably the line of questions 
continued with ‘[a]nd where do they get the money?’) A Buddhist representa-
tive declared, ‘we should make sure to always have a Jehovah’s  Witness in the 
front line when claiming our rights’.21 In fact, so prevalent amongst such groups 
is the conception of and admiration for JWs as leaders in rights achievement, 
that Markoviti argues that the Witnesses’ legal pursuit of their rights in Greece 
has a “filtering effect” for the impact of the ECtHR religion-related case law at 
the grassroots level:22 i.e., representatives of minority conscience-based groups 
tend to have a general sense that the JWs have done very well for themselves, 
and for others, in winning rights vis-à-vis the Greek state, and these represent-
atives know – and enjoy – the results of the JW legal struggles, even if they 
are unaware of the particular cases in question or even that they took place 
at the ECtHR.
Thus, albeit indirectly, the rich ECtHR case law of JWs versus the Greek state 
serves both to raise the rights consciousness of other religious minority groups 
in Greece and to inspire the latter in the pursuit of their religious rights claims. 
This “filtering effect” is particularly evident in how several representatives of 
other religious minority communities have followed the JWs’ lead in deciding 
whether to register for the new legal status available to them through a law 
introduced in 2015; ‘what did the Jehovah’s Witnesses say [about the new law]?’ 
asked one Bahá’í representative.23 As corroborated by a legal advisor of the JWs 
in Greece, ‘religious communities even call us to ask for advice on certain is-
sues’. This is not surprising, he contended, because ‘we represent about 90 per 
cent of religious freedoms cases from Greece!’
Accordingly, in this category of grassroots actors, we do not find evidence of 
Kokkinakis, per se, raising rights consciousness or inspiring legal mobilisation 
to secure their own religion-related rights. But, critically, we find the indirect 
effects of Kokkinakis and other JW-led case law, “filtered” through the Witness-
es’ broader success record at the Court.
21   This example is taken from M. Markoviti, ‘The “Filtering Effects” of ECtHR Case Law on 
Religious Freedoms: Legal Recognition and Places of Worship for Religious Minorities in 
Greece’ (Religion, State and Society, under review).
22   On this, see ibid.
23   Ibid.; see text for broader discussion of the 2015 law on legal status of religious minorities.
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Expectedly, in stark contrast to the lack of Kokkinakis awareness that we 
find amongst representatives of conscience-based minority groups, human 
rights lawyers are keenly aware of both the importance and the details of the 
case. They also express “unfiltered” influence of Kokkinakis on their work in 
the domain of religious freedom. Were it not for the litigious culture of the 
JWs, one such lawyer argued, Kokkinakis would not have happened, and Kok-
kinakis was key to what followed for religious freedom in Greece: ‘given the fact 
that the first and second Article 9 cases in Strasbourg were from Greece, the 
Greek lawyer learns faster than others that he or she can take a religious free-
doms case to the ECtHR’. Likewise, another lawyer and human rights activist 
described Kokkinakis as ‘enormously helpful’ in her own work: ‘We were always 
carrying Kokkinakis and Manoussakis in our files, carrying them like flags and 
threatening [our opponents] that we would go to the ECtHR’.
Other legal experts emphasised the fact that proselytism is no longer ‘a 
problem’ in Greece, by which they meant it is no longer a legal – not social – 
problem, even though the ban on proselytism remains in place. ‘I think no one 
cares about proselytism nowadays … in spite of the fact that the constitution 
prohibits it’, explains one cause lawyer. Another one takes the point a step 
further: ‘even though the law has not changed, the whole noise around it has 
stopped, which means that laws do not necessarily have to be changed’.
This quotation leads us to a question which pervades much of the interview 
research conducted for this study: should the law change? On this question our 
interlocutors fall into three different categories. Some, including the one quot-
ed immediately above, argue that the law is rather arbitrary and not where we 
need to focus if we want to see real change. His point was supported by the 
perspective of a cause lawyer who worked extensively with JW cases and who 
noted that Kokkinakis itself did not bring about immediate change, or much 
change at all in and of itself; rather, it took another legal mobilisation of the 
Witnesses – over the building of a place of worship in 1999 – to change the tide 
of public policy towards the faith group. She emphasised the importance of 
political will and agency in this case:
the Ombudsman’s intervention was strong in this [place of worship] 
case … The bethel was built with the protection of the police, for an en-
tire week we were escorted by the police. They worked non-stop, for a 
whole week, day and night.
Thus, she argued, ‘this is when things actually changed concerning JWs’, be-
cause, in spite of Kokkinakis, there were still prosecutions against proselytism; 
but the 1999 case changed the tide because of the publicity drawn to it.
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Unsurprisingly, representatives of the JWs take a different view – repre-
senting a second category of perspectives – on the importance of rescinding 
the law banning proselytism. Their legal counsel in Greece indicated that the 
 Ministry of Education circular distributed in police stations in the aftermath 
of Kokkinakis, asking the police to ‘be cautious when it comes to proselytism’, 
has limited the potential repercussions of their bearing witness, but he noted 
that police still do often hassle the Witnesses, quite simply because ‘the law 
has still not changed’:
Yes, things are better than in the 70s and 80s, when we had 100 plus court 
cases per month about proselytism especially. But there are still an-
noyances, “come to the station with me, and stay for 2 hours”, trying to 
stop them passing out literature … a priest could have called, a fanatic 
Orthodox. But not a word about removal of that law. No one dares re-
move that law.24
The latter point reflects the fact that the political costs have been too high and 
the potential gains too limited for rescinding the ban on proselytism. As Nich-
olas Hatzis notes, ‘In general, governmental interference with religious affairs 
will be prone to yield majoritarian results reflective of the political influence 
of various religious groups’.25
The concerns of the above-cited JW are not unfounded, given that even as 
late as 2011 an evangelical Protestant was imprisoned in Greece for proselytism 
and given the perspective of the third category of interlocutors on the ques-
tion of whether the proselytism ban should be rescinded. One professor of 
Orthodox theology and one legal advisor to a conservative union of Orthodox 
theologians share the perspective that the law must remain in place because 
‘it [proselytism] has not stopped, contrary to what some argue’. According to 
this legal advisor, proselytism is ‘punishable in all European countries, includ-
ing in the US’, and the state has a legitimate reason to protect its citizens from 
it. The professor of Orthodox theology elaborated on the very live threat of 
proselytism with an example from the domain of religious education. Citing 
the efforts by “progressive” theologians to lessen its catechetical character and 
teach more about different faiths, he indicated:
24   This quote is taken from an interview conducted by the author with the same JW repre-
sentative, in 2013.
25   N. Hatzis, ‘Neutrality, Proselytism, and Religious Minorities at the European Court of 
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’, 49 Harvard International Law Journal (2009), 
pp. 120–131.
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to put students in the shoes and the spiritual mindset of other religions is 
proselytism! … They want to offer students this multireligious poison … 
and thus create confusion, as you cannot teach the kids about 9 or 10 re-
ligions! The way things are, students are being taught about religions in a 
descriptive, informative and neutral manner26 … To do otherwise means 
to proselytise … it means lack of respect to the Constitution and of the 
ECtHR, since you are not respecting someone else’s religion!
Finally, the aforementioned legal advisor defended the proselytism ban with 
the support of the ECtHR: ‘[the Kokkinakis judgment] said that the constitu-
tional prohibition of proselytism does not contradict the ECHR’. He repeats 
this point twice in the course of the interview, and further claims that ‘the 
Court only observed that proselytism should entail some kind of pressure [in 
order for it to be punishable]’.
Indeed, Kokkinakis served defenders of the Greek proselytism ban a gift. 
And it is on this point, of what the split legacy of Kokkinakis means for the 
freedom to manifest one’s faith – including through proselytism – that the 
Greek grassroots level engagements with Kokkinakis can be brought to bear on 
broader discussions of the legacy of the case.
4 The Radiating Effects of Kokkinakis: Insights from the Greek 
Context
What did Kokkinakis really achieve? Certainly this question has been debated 
heatedly starting from the separate opinions in the 1993 judgment and contin-
uing to today in the present collection of articles. Amongst its achievements 
in the Greek context we see that, whether directly or indirectly, Kokkinakis has 
served as an important resource for grassroots level actors in Greece. It has also 
certainly been successful in almost completely resolving the ‘problem of pros-
elytism’, in terms of the legal and political costs to the state of Greece because 
there are no longer (many) convictions for proselytism.
26   This is however not the case; rather, the current teaching of religion in Greek public 
schools clearly violates the principles set out in Folgero. See M. Markoviti, ‘In-between the 
Constitution and the European Court of Human Rights: Mobilizations around Religion 
and Education in Greece’ (under review at Politics and Religion); see also E. Fokas and 
M. Markoviti, ‘Religious Pluralism and Education in Greece’, LSE Hellenic Observatory 
blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2017/03/01/religious-pluralism-and-education-in-
greece/, 1 March 2017.
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Consensus is lacking, however, on whether it matters that Kokkinakis has 
had this effect indirectly, not directly: it had this effect from the drawer of the 
police station desks where the Ministry of Education-generated circular on 
Kokkinakis has served simultaneously as a warning and reminder for police 
that people cannot be jailed for sharing their faith, and a justification that po-
lice can use to explain to complainants why the Jehovah’s Witness in question 
could not be sent to jail.27 It has not had this positive effect from a change in 
the relevant laws.
From one perspective, this might be described as a rather impressive feat – 
that Kokkinakis could thus resolve what was once such a menace to JWs and 
other minority religious groups practicing proselytism, without necessitating 
a change in the law. From another perspective though, taking a closer look 
at developments on the ground in Greece, Kokkinakis may be seen as a battle 
won but a war that was lost. Minos Kokkinakis was vindicated, but the message 
communicated by the Court was ultimately one of tolerance towards the Greek 
state; the Court recognises, in providing the background to the case, that:
The Christian Eastern Orthodox Church, which during nearly four centu-
ries of foreign occupation symbolised the maintenance of Greek culture 
and the Greek language, took an active part in the Greek people’s strug-
gle for emancipation, to such an extent that Hellenism is to some extent 
identified with the Orthodox faith.28
And in so doing it helped to further legitimate a system which hinges on the re-
lationship between religion and national identity. When asked why the some-
what more direct route of rescinding the antiquated law introduced during 
a military dictatorship to criminalise proselytism was not selected, a repre-
sentative of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs indicated that the 
Metaxas laws ‘will change … they cannot but change at some point’, but:
27   On this point, see E. Fokas, ‘Banal, Benign or Pernicious? Religion and National Identity 
from the Perspective of Religious Minorities in Greece’, 17:1 New Diversities (2015), 
pp. 47–62, and E. Fokas, ‘Notes Towards Connecting the Disconnect: The Role of the 
Religion-National Identity Link’, in M.-C. Foblets, K. Alidadi, J. Nielsen, and Z. Yanasmayan 
(eds.), Belief, Law and Politics: What Future for a Secular Europe? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 
pp. 197–200.
28   European Court of Human Rights, Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, judg-
ment of 25 May 1993, para. 24.
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At this point in time, because of the [financial] crisis, the far right forces 
are heightened in Greece … This means that as soon as you speak about 
such things, you will have an attack from this part of Greek society, which 
is horizontal, it is in all institutions and in all parties … That’s why this 
whole management requires care.
The bureaucrat’s indirect reference to the ultra-nationalist tendencies in 
Greece is measured and reasonable, and is matched on both counts by that 
of a JW using the same reasoning to argue for an end to the ban sooner rather 
than later: precisely because ‘the police face such pressure from those who do 
not like minorities’, a rescinding of the proselytism ban is the best way to help 
them serve justice and resist those pressures. From this JW’s perspective, the 
failure to abolish the law criminalising proselytism continues to signal to the 
mass public – members of which may be likely to contact the police about an 
“annoyance” from a ‘proselytising Protestant’ – that proselytism is illegal and 
that the rights of the majority are being violated when people of a different 
faith approach them in the hope of converting them.29
Here the words of Judge Martens in 1993 in his partly dissenting opinion 
echo those concerns expressed by a Jehovah’s Witness 20 years later:
To allow States to interfere in the “conflict” implied in proselytising by 
making proselytising a criminal offence would not only run counter to 
the strict neutrality which the State is required to maintain in this field 
but also create the danger of discrimination when there is one dominant 
religion … the State is lacking intrinsic justification for attributing greater 
value to the freedom not to be proselytised than to the right to proselytise 
and, consequently, for introducing a criminal-law provision protecting 
the former at the cost of the latter.30
Now 25 years later, both because of and in spite of Kokkinakis, Judge Martens’ 
worries and criticisms ring as relevant as ever in the contemporary Greek 
context.
29   From an interview conducted by the author with a JW representative in 2013.
30   Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, paras. 15–16.
